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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, we take inspiration from Thomas Malthus' hypothesis that food shortage and 
hunger would remain "nature's last most dreadful resource" and that "the power of population is 
so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must 
in some shape or other visit the human race". We revise and reinterprete it into a modern and 
thus global version and we elaborate on such a possible new interpretation and what its policy 
implications might be. In a first section, and somewhat as a parenthesis, we briefly comment on 
the financial crisis as it has unfolded over the last four months of 2008 and impacted gradually 
the real economy. In the second section of the paper we review the different policy responses to 
past Malthusian challenges: how food production succeeded particularly over the second half of 
the 20th Century to keep pace with rapid population growth. In a third section, we replace the 
word "population" in the above cited Malthus' quote with "consumption" and illustrate what this 
                                                 
1
  This paper has been prepared as part of a foresight exercise about “The World in 2025” on the request of 
the European Commission, Directorate for Science, Economy and Society in close collaboration with the Bureau of 
Economic Policy Advisors. I’m grateful to comments received from colleagues during presentation before the expert 
group. Errors remain my own.  
2
  Luc Soete is Professor of International Economic Relations and Director of the Maastricht Economic and 
social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology of the United Nations University  (UNU-
MERIT), University of Maastricht, The Netherlands.  
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might imply for global world growth and Europe's place in the world in 2025. In a fourth and 
final section, we then draw some initial policy conclusions. The nature of the Malthusian 
challenges raised today appears both global and local in nature. On the one hand it raises 
questions with respect to the need for open, international research collaboration. Imposing 
national, or regional, boundaries with respect to research participation and funding, certainly 
appears (with respect to some of the most urgent Malthusian research problems) to be the 
expression of an outdated and wasteful research nationalism. On the other hand, the growing 
need for local knowledge re-use, adaptation and embedment in many emerging and developing 
countries involving efforts at local innovation, is in many ways similar to, and reminiscent of the 
development of the many innovation policy tools in European countries and regions. The first 
policy challenge, we refer to as "recherche sans frontières"; the second one as "innovation for 
local development". 
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Introduction 
 
Quite suddenly, a hypothesis which seemed to be disregarded and rejected for the last 30 years, 
now appears to get some benefit of the doubt. It is not the original version of Thomas Malthus’ 
hypothesis, that food shortage and hunger would remain "nature's last most dreadful resource", 
but a more sophisticated, revised global version. Once the word “population” in the famous 
Malthus quote that: “the power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce 
subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race” is 
replaced by consumption, both present, real consumption and future, global consumption 
aspirations, the old Malthus’ quote takes on a new, more intriguing 21st Century meaning.  
 
In this paper, we elaborate on such a possible new interpretation and what its policy implications 
might be. Written as part of a more technology/economic inspired contribution to a European 
foresight exercise about what the world might look like in 2025, it seemed natural to start such a 
brainstorming exercise with the most well-known historical economic attempt at forecasting: the 
one by Thomas Malthus two hundred years ago, adapted though to modern times.  
 
In a first section, and somewhat as a parenthesis, we briefly comment on the financial crisis as it 
has unfolded over the last four months of 2008 and impacted gradually the real economy. The 
financial crisis with its dramatic collapse in demand has undoubtedly softened in the short term 
some of the Malthusian challenges discussed in this paper. However, it is unlikely to provide any 
long term breathing space. On the contrary, any scenario of rapid recovery is likely to be quickly 
confronted with the various Malthusian limits to global growth as described below. In this sense 
the financial crisis of 2008 might, in an indirect way, be illustrative of the intrinsic sustainable 
growth bottlenecks global society has increasingly become confronted with.  
 
In the second section of the paper we review the different policy responses to past Malthusian 
challenges: how food production succeeded particularly over the second half of the 20th Century 
to keep pace with rapid population growth. There are still many lessons to be learned from this 
recent past: lessons which appear not to have been picked up in the recent debate about rising 
food prices. Similarly, whereas world population growth no longer appears to raise major 
Malthusian concerns today, the huge differences in population growth rates across regions in the 
world – with the most rapid population growth occurring in regions, such as the Middle East and 
Northern Africa, least well endowed with arable land, access to fresh water and most subject to 
further environmental deterioration as a possible consequence of climate change – raise major 
global migration pressures very much Malthusian in nature and origin.  
 
In a third section, we replace the word “population” in the above cited Malthus’ quote with 
“consumption” and illustrate what this might imply for global world growth and Europe’s place 
in the world in 2025.  Such replacement appears justified following the global diffusion of new 
digital information and communication technologies over the last thirty years with the uptake of 
those technologies across the world at a historically unprecedented speed. We suggest that future 
population growth appears today a more relevant measure of future market opportunities, 
indicative of unfulfilled consumption aspirations, than current GDP which appears in many ways 
more of an economic measure of industrial strength of the past.  
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In a fourth and final section, we then draw some initial policy conclusions. The nature of the 
Malthusian challenges raised today appears both global and local in nature. On the one hand it 
raises questions with respect to the need for open, international research collaboration. Imposing 
national, or regional, boundaries with respect to research participation and funding, certainly 
appears (with respect to some of the most urgent Malthusian research problems) to be the 
expression of an outdated and wasteful research nationalism. On the other hand, the growing 
need for local knowledge re-use, adaptation and embedment in many emerging and developing 
countries involving efforts at local innovation, is in many ways similar to, and reminiscent of the 
development of the many innovation policy tools in European countries and regions. The first 
policy challenge, we refer to as “recherche sans frontières”; the second one as “innovation for 
local development”.  
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1. Reflections on a unique financial crisis very different from previous downturns 
 
The financial crisis, as it unfolded in 2008, is rapidly starting to affect the real economy across 
the globe. The collapse in demand appears to spread across many sectors from durable consumer 
goods such as motor cars to machinery and investment goods. In many sectors, investment 
decisions have been scrapped or delayed. Unemployment, and not just of temporarily employed 
labour, is rising rapidly in most countries across the world.   
 
The McKinsey Global Institute describes the unique features of the current crisis along the 
following four lines. First and most dramatically since September 2008, a more or less systemic 
failure of credit markets with a large number of such markets coming to a stand still at the same 
time. Second, high leverage levels in combination with asset write downs have resulted in a 
further credit contraction that slows GDP as less cash for investments is made easily available. 
Third, the globally interconnected world of the 21st Century with more countries than ever 
belonging to the WTO implies that for the first time all large economies and markets across the 
globe are hit, limiting the possibility of recovery through strong demand or capital injection in 
one region benefiting other regions. And fourth, the mutually reinforcing effect of the financial 
crisis and the resulting global economic recession impacts the economy in a variety of different 
financial and real, local and global ways making outcomes much harder to predict and 
potentially very negative. The figure below from the MGI illustrates well the mutually 
reinforcing negative effects of the financial crisis. As the figure highlights, interdependencies in 
financial assets and the real economy which had been beneficial to the economy over the last 
decade, became in an unfavourable economic environment detrimental to the economy. 
Economists have pointed to the dangers of such volatility impacts. Thus as Gallegati et al. (2008) 
noted long before the financial crisis: “private incentives are such that too many linkages are 
formed with respect to what is socially desirable. The risk of contagion increases the volatility of 
the outcome and thus reduces the ability of the financial networks to provide risk-sharing.”3 As a 
result next to the dramatic collapse in final consumer demand, which affected many durable 
consumer goods sector such as motor cars, there has been a collapse in risk-taking investment 
with a shift in financial markets’ readiness to provide risk capital. At the same time, the 
investment opportunities on offer to venture capital and private equity rapidly dried up.  
 
 
                                                 
3
  Gallegati, Mauro; Greenwald Bruce; Richiardi, Matteo and Joseph Stiglitz (2008), “An Asymmetric Effect 
of Diffusion Processes: Risk Sharing and Contagion”, Global Economy Journal, 8(3)   
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4
THE CURRENT CRISIS IS DRIVEN BY MUTUALLY REINFORCING EFFECTS 
SO MAY LAST LONGER THAN EXPECTED
Source: Morgan Stanley; Federal Reserve; BEA; The Economist; McKinsey analysis
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One of the reasons why the issue of knowledge investments has played a limited role in the 
current debate on the financial crisis is the policy need for immediate, short term outcomes of the 
proposed interventions. Most of the financial interventions appear first and foremost of the “fire 
fighting” sort, e.g. providing liquidity in the financial system and in a second phase addressing 
the fire spreading across the initially assumed immune national parts of each country’s financial 
system, such as the granting of state guarantees for inter-bank loans or the state guarantees of the 
minimum amount of saving deposits. The next phase in the spreading of the financial crisis is the 
impact this massive destruction of capital is likely to have on consumer and investment/saving 
habits of citizens. There are several scenarios. The first one starts from the assumption that 
citizens will, to the extent possible, try to restore their assets and savings by increasing as rapidly 
as possible their savings. This can be readily observed in many of the traditionally high-saving 
European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, the Scandinavian countries or The Netherlands, 
but even countries such as the US and the UK which had traditionally much lower savings 
ratio’s. As a result, the high income inequality within developed and emerging countries which 
had been an engine for the strong consumer-led growth path in the US, Europe and many 
emerging economies (Russia, Brazil, Latin America, Eastern Europe) no longer induces such 
strong demand-led global growth impact, filtering through to the rest of the global economy 
through remittances, and other demand multiplier effects. On the contrary, the high income 
inequality is now likely to become a major source for high savings, being invested now in secure 
government bonds. As a result the financial crisis is spreading much more rapidly than expected 
to the real economy with major global implications.  
 
A different, and to some extent opposite scenario would start from the assumption that precisely 
because the financial crisis has affected primarily those more well-off having invested funds in 
high risk products, it is unlikely to have major macro-economic negative growth impacts. Rather 
it will hasten the decline of individual rich persons or families, allowing for the entry of 
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newcomers including also emerging economies on the global financial scene. It is interesting 
from this perspective that China today is keener than ever to position its national currency as a 
new reserve currency.  
 
So the distributional impact on the real economy of the present financial crisis remains subject to 
debate. In the meantime, the academic policy debate appears to have shifted to the need for 
stronger global regulation in the financial sector with proposals for a Bretton Woods 2, for 
drastic reductions in the financial perks and golden severance payments given to financial CEOs 
while leaving most of the financial losses with share holders, both private small individual 
shareholders as well as institutional shareholders. Saving accounts holders are protected at least 
as long as they invests their savings nationally, while governments have become themselves 
speculative shareholders using their own state prerogatives to bet on a rise in stock market value. 
As a European politician put it: “capitalism for the poor in the US as the origin of the crisis, 
socialism for the rich in Europe as the solution to the crisis”. 
 
What can one say about the impact of the financial crisis on knowledge investments? Continuous 
high knowledge investments particularly in the highly developed countries have been the major 
factor behind long term welfare growth. That is also the reason why countries, such as the EU 
ones, have been keen on setting long term targets for increasing such knowledge investments. So 
leaving aside the nature of such knowledge investment and their geographical scope as discussed 
below in section 4, the question touches on an essential feature of long term growth and 
development.  
 
At the micro-economic level, the negative impact of the recession on profitability forces firms in 
the short term to focus on the most productive segments of their output. Furthermore, the 
opportunity costs of achieving productivity growth are likely to be lower in recessions, providing 
incentives to undertake research activities in downturns (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Canton 
and Uhlig, 1999). Finally, R&D-personnel will be subject to “labour hoarding”; the most 
qualified scientists and engineers are kept at the expense of the lower skilled personnel. The 
internal training of highly skilled R&D personnel requires in some high tech sectors more than 
ten years, sacking such personnel has generally remained a measure of last resort. This feature 
also explains why firms during expanding growth phases have often restructured their R&D 
activities, thereby increasingly calling upon external R&D expertise. As the economic crisis is 
likely to spread in 2009 in Europe, it can actually be expected that that the R&D/GDP ratio of 
European countries might actually rise. 
 
With respect to innovation, the opposite, cyclical view appears more likely. Innovation or the 
implementation of new ideas is likely to be postponed in a recession till the boom period 
(Shleiffer, 1986 and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2003). The old, so-called innovation acceleration 
hypothesis of Gerhard Mensch (1975) whereby radical innovation would be favoured in 
recessions/depressions out of despair has been empirically rejected (Clark, Freeman and Soete, 
1981). Alongside such cyclical trends there are, however, also more structural factors which 
might impact directly European research and innovation.  
 
The nature of those structural factors can, at the present moment, only be derived from anecdotal 
evidence, analytical speculation and historical example. One may start with the uniqueness of the 
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crisis originating ultimately from within the financial sector4 and affecting the real economy 
under the form of a dramatic change in “risk aversiveness”. As a result private financial 
institutions which normally play the role of central agents in any counter-cyclical recovery 
policy have become “dead bodies”. At the same time there is now a widespread lack of trust in 
future risks with private investors primarily as a result of the huge write-offs over the last year. 
All this leads to growing distrust in society. As a result the new dominant philosophy of “Cash is 
king” has a direct negative impact on knowledge investments. Within stock listed companies, 
where the CFO will put pressure on the CEO to distribute as much of the limited profits as 
dividends – in a recession a crucial differentiating factor signaling solvability and management 
reputation. In a growing number of non high-tech firms this is likely to prevail over long term 
R&D investment commitment. Within SMEs as credit is becoming difficult to get, the focus will 
rather shift to organisational and easy to implement process innovations reducing costs and 
inventories. New product innovations and renewal investments will be postponed. Finally high-
tech starters will postpone the introduction of new product innovations. As a result seed money 
providers will have difficulties in finding sufficient worthwhile investment proposals. The 
venture capital market collapses.  
 
In short, the financial crisis has been accompanied by a shift in favour of risk averseness with as 
most direct impact on the real economy, a move away from investments in risky activities such 
as R&D and innovation. At the global level though, the crisis is likely to lead to an increased 
“offshoring” and “outsourcing” of private R&D: a more rapid relocation of certain parts of R&D 
(in particular development) to cheaper locations in emerging countries with a strong scientific 
base such as China and India. Furthermore, there is likely to be also increased “national  
outsourcing” of private R&D from large firms to small firms with increased specialisation and 
the incumbents’ large private R&D labs playing increasingly a new local role as “open”, more 
systemic innovation infrastructure. “Open” also to public participation from universities and 
public research institutes. This development might be particularly beneficial to the developments 
described in section 4 below. In this sense, it might be argued that the financial crisis provides a 
new opportunity to reassess the contribution knowledge investments both private and public, will 
have to make to long term sustainable growth and development so as to overcome the various 
Malthusian challenges described in the next sections.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
  In this we do not follow the fascinating, but in our view as yet unsubstantiated, view of Perez (2009) 
linking directly the internet bubble of the early 21st century to the present financial crisis.   
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 2. On past Malthusian challenges 
 
Thomas Malthus has of course been most dramatically contradicted by the rapid growth in 
population over the last Century, and in particular after the Second World War, with world food 
production keeping well ahead of the world’s most rapid growth ever in population.  
 
a) On food production  
 
It is undoubtedly one of the major global achievements of the period of cold-war rapid economic 
growth: “les trentes glorieuses” in the words of the French economic historian Jean Fourastié5, 
roughly speaking the post-war period between 1950 and 1973, when food production succeeded 
in keeping up with an exponential growth rate in world population. In saying this, I obviously do 
not want to underplay the numerous famines as they affected a number of developing countries 
in the 70’s and 80’s, but rather belabour the point that such famines were less associated with 
nature’s impossibility to keep up agricultural production than with political and human 
mismanagement. As Amartya Sen’s 1982 classic book on "Poverty and Famines" has 
convincingly argued, there has never been “a famine in any country that has been a democracy 
with a relatively free press".  
 
However, given the historically unprecedented growth in agricultural production over the post-
war period, it is surprising that so little attention is being paid in the current food debate to the 
characteristics of agricultural production during the early post-war period and in particular to the 
rich economic literature (Hayami and Ruttan, 1970, and Griliches, 1957) on the nature of 
technical improvements in agriculture; the particular role of different, so-called agricultural 
knowledge “extension schemes”; the significant role of publicly funded research in enhancing 
food productivity; the limited role of intellectual property protection with respect to seeds, 
fertilizers as well as irrigation and other farming techniques; the dominance of local production 
over international trade with as a consequence a more limited product variety available to local 
consumers more closely linked to seasonal production, etc.  
 
All those issues appear at first sight also of particular relevance to the current situation of rapidly 
rising food prices. We know, as a matter of fact, surprisingly little about the underlying structural 
causes behind the present rise in food prices. Leaving out possible speculative and other short 
term effects on food prices, the following questions appear of particular relevance to the current 
policy debate. To what extent are current food shortages the result of failures to introduce at the 
global world level, large scale farm production techniques as for instance typified by Europe’s 
Common Agricultural Policy introduced in the 70’s and 80’s, or rather the opposite: the result of 
failures to introduce small scale, locally adapted rural agricultural production techniques? Or of 
more immediate concern: to what extent are present world food shortages the result of recent 
reforms in European agricultural policy with the structural removal out of agriculture production 
of large areas of agricultural land? Might such policies at a moment of rapidly rising food 
demand not have exacerbated the problem of reduced food supply? And at the level of research: 
to what extent has research on agricultural production shifted from a national priority with the 
involvement of large public research laboratories to an area with low public and increasing 
private sector research interest? What have been the implications of such a policy shift on the 
                                                 
5
  See Fourastié, J., 1979. Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975. 
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access to, and the diffusion of, soil and agricultural knowledge; farming and irrigation 
techniques6 and; more broadly, environmentally sustainable, agricultural development?  
 
A first relevant policy conclusion might therefore consist of the need to re-prioritize agricultural 
research as an area, not of “grand” but of “glocal challenge”: global in nature but local in 
implementation with particular attention being paid to world regions’ environmental, including 
fresh water availability, comparative advantage. Such “re-prioritization” will also need to pay 
particular attention to the growing convergence between food and nutrition research and what it 
implies in terms of the trade-off between increased intellectual property protection and the 
resulting international trading of licenses and global access to such knowledge.  
 
b) On population dynamics 
 
With respect to population dynamics, by contrast, world population growth has gradually 
adjusted downwards over the last thirty years. Any tendency towards a continuous exponential 
population growth rate has been proven to be false. The present world population of 6.6 billion, 
increasing at a daily rate of some 200,000 is expected to peak in absolute terms at some 9.5 
billion between now and 2025. The exponential growth after 1950 when world population was 
just 2.5 billion did ultimately evolve in a non-linear, typical s-shape curve.  
 
Certainly with respect to world population demographics, Thomas Malthus appears to have been 
disproven totally. Actually, and contrary to Malthusian expectations, it is the impact of improved 
health and sanitation conditions on life expectancy which has, as a second order effect, brought 
down most significantly population growth. The main reason being of course that those health 
and sanitation improvements were accompanied by contraception technologies, shifting 
dramatically the balance between desired procreation and accidental one. In this sense, it can be 
expected that improvements in world-wide health and sanitation conditions will further reduce 
child mortality in the least developed countries, reducing in the longer term the way parents want 
to insure their own future by having large numbers of children. It is in other words, and from a 
Malthisian perspective somewhat paradoxical, the combination of health improvements and the 
ensuing reduced mortality rate which is behind the long term decline in population growth and 
ultimately the more or less expected future stable world population size of arond 9,5 billion.  
 
While population growth does not play any longer a direct role in the Malthusian predicament, it 
remains though an important overall context condition. In Table 1, based on data originally 
collected by Maddison (2003), the historical share of countries both in population and GDP over 
the last 200 hundred years is presented for China, India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 
What remains from a historical perspective, particularly striking is how the two largest countries 
in the world: China and India, saw their population world share and their share of world GDP fall 
                                                 
6
  One may think here of various digitally controlled drip irrigation techniques when converting desert into 
farmland producing low water intensive crops. As a recent article in the IHT pointed out, most rapid population 
growth occurs in regions such as Northern Africa and the Middle East with the least available land with fresh water 
availability.  Whereas in the oil-rich countries in those regions, money can solve the water shortage problem, the 
solution is obviously not sustainable: “You can bring in money and water and you can make the desert green until 
either the water runs out or the money”(Martin, Andrew, “Population rises, resources dwindle and there is no easy 
solution”, International Herald Tribune, July 22nd, 2008).        
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significantly over the period 1820 till 1973. In 1973, the imbalance between the world’s 
concentration of GDP and the world’s concentration of population was historically probably the 
most extreme one ever.  
 
 
Table 1: China India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico in the World Economy  
Share in world population and world GDP: 1820-2001 
Percentage share of world population
Year China India Brazil South Africa Mexico Total
1820 36.6 19.9 0.4 0.1 0.6 57.6
1870 28.1 17.0 0.8 0.2 0.7 46.8
1913 24.4 14.2 1.3 0.3 0.8 41.0
1950 21.7 14.8 2.1 0.5 1.1 40.2
1973 22.5 14.8 2.6 0.6 1.5 42.0
2001 20.7 16.5 2.9 0.7 1.7 42.5
2006 20.2 16.9 2.9 0.7 1.7 42.3
Percentage share of world income
Year China India Brazil South Africa Mexico Total
1820 32.9 16.0 0.4 0.1 0.7 50.1
1870 17.1 12.1 0.6 0.2 0.6 30.6
1913 8.8 7.5 0.7 0.4 0.9 18.3
1950 4.5 4.2 1.7 0.6 1.3 12.3
1973 4.6 3.1 2.5 0.6 1.7 12.5
2001 12.3 5.4 2.7 0.5 1.9 22.8
2006 16.8 6.1 2.4 0.5 1.8 27.4
Source: Deepak Nayyar (2008) based on data from Maddison (2003); Maddison(forthcoming)
 
 
 
Again in the current debate little attention has been paid to the rich, and sometimes controversial 
literature on such global unequal development paths between the developed OECD countries and 
the developing world with many debates amongst trade theorists and development economists 
about, amongst others: unequal exchange, import substitution and the need for infant industry 
development strategies, the impact of de-colonisation and the many early development attempts 
in developing countries at self-reliance, etc. Viewed in retrospect all these contributions were 
first and foremost inspired by concerns about rising global inequality and what appeared at that 
time to be an intrinsic lack of autonomous growth and development opportunities for many 
developing countries, just having achieved political independence but by and large still being 
economically tied to their previous colonial powers7.  
 
I would also argue that it is this extreme geographical inequality in world GDP in the 60’s and 
early 70’s which has formed the basis for the sheer unilateral focus of social scientists and policy 
                                                 
7
  It might be noted that while India and China have been expanding their industry at a very fast rate and are 
undergoing industrial revolutions, the absolute numbers employed in manufacturing as well as the share of 
manufacturing in total employment has been falling. Many scholars would argue that the two countries should have 
had their industrial revolutions more than a hundred years ago but that they were thwarted in this endeavour by 
colonialism including unequal treaties. 
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makers on strengthening domestic competitiveness as the essential feature for a country’s future 
economic growth.  As Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, discussing the recent 
phenomenon of globalization, put it a couple of years ago:  “The consequences of this for society 
(and sociology) have been spelt out most clearly in the English-speaking countries, but above all 
Britain, where it has been forcefully argued that conventional social and political science remains 
caught up in a national-territorial concept of society. Critics of ‘methodological nationalism’ 
have attacked its explicit or implicit premise that the national state is the ‘container’ of social 
processes and that the national framework is still the one best suited to measure and analyse 
major social, economic and political changes.” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) This national-
territorial obsession of social scientists was particularly reflected in policy makers desire in both 
developed and developing countries alike, to be technologically independent, to create national 
technology support policies aimed at strengthening the country’s technological competitiveness. 
As a matter of fact, in the 70’s the notion of technological independence was quite popular in the 
development literature8.  
 
In many developing countries, poorly endowed with arable land and/or natural resources, 
peripheral islands or land-locked countries/regions, the old Malthusian concerns about rapid 
local population growth and limited local opportunities for low cost agricultural production still 
exist. As a matter of fact lack of development appears still closely associated with population 
dynamics9 with most rapid population growth occurring in regions, such as the Middle East and 
Northern Africa, least well endowed with arable land and access to fresh water. Furthermore, 
those regions appear often the most fragile and most subject to further environmental 
deterioration following climate change. The historical Malthusian solution, large foreign 
emigration is still today the clearest manifestation of the local validity in many regions in the 
world of Malthus’ predicament.  
                                                 
8
  See in particular Soete (1981) 
9
  As Sen (1998) pointed out the ability of countries to reduce their mortality can be seen as a test of their 
economic performance.  
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3. The new Malthusian 21st Century challenge: “global” consumer aspirations 
 
The advent of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution in the 80’s and 
90’s radically challenged the national-territorial bias in social sciences research and policy 
making10.  As argued elsewhere, the cluster of ICT represents a historically unique process of 
technological, organisational and above all social transformation at the global level, both in 
terms of speed and in terms of world-wide impact.  
 
The two clusters of technology Information Technology (IT) and Communication Technology 
(CT) have each played a crucial role here. At the IT level, there has been the continuous 
technological improvement (Moore’s Law) in semiconductors. This 30 year long continuous 
technological improvement, combined with the tendency to miniaturise IT, has enabled the 
physical integration of electronic functions in existing (and new) equipment and led to an ever-
increasing diffusion of IT applications throughout practically all sectors of the economy. In short 
what has been called a 'general purpose' technology (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), the 
diffusion of which has been accompanied by a great many organisational mismatches and 
tensions (Freeman and Perez, 1988; David, 1991). Ultimately, the possibilities for such ever-
increasing miniaturisation (“More than Moore”) opened the avenue to nanotechnology, i.e., the 
production of electronic material at sub-micron level that can interact with tiny matter and cells, 
including live cells. These mainly technologically driven developments towards miniaturisation 
illustrate that the technological trajectory within the IT sector is far from completed with 
application areas, described today as nano-electronics continuing to expand further to other, new 
areas.  
 
The technological improvements in the CT cluster have been, if anything, as impressive. Both 
the continuous developments in the field of optical fibres allowing for the transmission of digital 
signals without noticeable loss of energy and mobile communication have radically altered the 
notions of distance The concept of 'death of distance' (Cairncross, 1997) describes well the 
radical changes those technologies have brought about at the world level. Mobile 
communication, with its unique features both in terms of diffusion speed and geographical 
coverage of number of users (currently half the world population) represents in many ways an 
ultimate form of global reachability. It implies also along the end of the physical distance factor, 
the end of segmented information and the end of geographical boundaries in world citizens 
and/or world consumer’s aspirations to find a good job and to enjoy material welfare.  
 
As with other radical social transformations there is no way to reverse those changes: the spirit of 
global aspirations is, as it were, out of the box. National boundaries in opportunities for jobs, for 
studying, for communication, for travelling, for social exchanges are increasingly rejected by 
employees, students, internet users, tourists alike. In terms of life long aspirations, the world has 
truly become global.  
 
Coming back to our previous discussion on population dynamics, this means effectively that size 
of population is likely to become a more directly relevant indicator of future potential growth 
                                                 
10
  See among others; Clark, Freeman and Soete, 1981, Freeman, Clark, and Soete, 1982, Freeman and Soete, 
1987 
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and future market opportunities, than GDP which appears more a reflection of the industrial 
wealth of the past11.  
 
For countries like the EU ones, it means that their future global economic role will decline 
substantially in the years to come: first, because of the decline in Europe’s own share in world 
population given the current demographic structure of EU population; second, because Europe’s 
is likely to witness over the years to come a substantially lower GDP growth compared to that of 
most of the large emerging economies. To put it bluntly: in 2025, of the 15 most populated 
countries in the world: all countries with more than 100 million inhabitants, not a single one will 
be a European country. In 2025, the EU will be primarily composed of relatively small 
countries. Only in areas where the EU-27 acts as a singly country, such as in the case of the 
WTO, will the EU play an important international role.  
 
There is little doubt, as argued in the previous section that most of the Malthusian doubts arising 
today are first and foremost related to the combination of increasingly global consumption 
aspirations confronted with a global and local mismanagment of food supply and growing 
ecological pressures on “the power of the earth” to expand at low costs its supply of food. The 
“power of the earth” to produce food has been estimated by agronomers to be capable of 
providing sufficient food to no less than 20, even 40 billion people. However, such global food 
production would require an optimal, ideal earth “gardening” strategy optimizing available land 
across countries and regions, and harvesting the ideal soil combinations of food, while at the 
same time eliminating some of the most energy-intensive food production activities, such as 
meat. The current fragmented global agricultural system is far removed from this ideal optimized 
world (Svedin, 2008). As a matter of fact, it is clear that once all emissions and other 
environmental costs of the Western world’s energy-intensive food consumption pattern are 
accounted for, the present world agricultural system would be unable to provide for such a food 
consumption pattern for the global world population of 6.6 billion, let alone a future world 
population of 9 to 10 billion. At the same time, the demand pressure, given the global 
convergence in “consumption aspiration” patterns towards such energy-intensive food 
consumption patterns is rising rapidly with growing income in the emerging countries. 
Furthermore, the pressures on available arable land will increase following the emerging 
profitable opportunities for farming biofuels.  
 
In short, in pure Malthusian tradition the current rise in prices of agricultural commodities, and 
more broadly natural resources, is likely to have a strong structural component, raising not just 
major global, macro-economic issues about rising inflationary pressures in both developed and 
developing countries, but also increasing distributional issues with significant shifts in the terms 
of trade in favour of countries well endowed with natural resources and, within countries with an 
increasing number of low income groups in society becoming confronted with difficulties in 
getting acces to basic subsistence commodities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  Like numbers of tractors in agriculture or steel were with respect to the measure of industrial wealth in 
former centrally planned economies.   
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4. The new “glocal” research and innovation Malthusian policy challenges 
 
As highlighted in section 2, it were first and foremost improvements in technology that enabled 
the supply of food to keep up with population growth in the 50’s and 60’s of last Century and 
counter most of our Malthusian fears.  
 
Within the present global context the challenge is, as argued above, much more complex. There 
is not just a “global” need for the development of major, sometimes radical improvements in 
energy-saving technologies, sustainable food and energy production, carbon-neutral transport 
systems, sustainable water management, to name but a few, there is also a need for the quick 
implementation of such new technological improvements within the fast growing environments 
of many emerging countries, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
This combined, new Malthusian “glocal challenge” of ensuring that “the power of the earth” 
remains in line with global consumption aspirations fundamentally questions the organisation of 
research and innovation activities in the rich, developed countries, and in particular the European 
ones after the period of decolonization, within the contours of their own national boundaries, or 
as in the case of the EU, within the contours of the EU.  
 
a) Recherche sans frontières12 
 
There is little doubt that the process of economic integration in Europe has also had a major 
effect on intra-European research cooperation and networking. As is well-known the gradual 
enlargement of the EU in the late 1970s led to a broader set of policies aimed at strengthening 
intra-European cooperation in areas such as pre-competitive research. In a similar way to trade 
theories about economic integration, it could be argued that this European research integration 
process had both positive and negative effects. Positive effects included the ‘creation’ of new 
research through the additional joint EU research projects initiated, and the new insights into 
specifically European problems such research provided. Among the negative effects is what 
could be called research ‘diversion’, i.e. the redirection of research activities, nationally funded 
but with an international focus, towards European research issues. Elsewhere, I have suggested 
(Soete, 1997) that these diversion effects of knowledge – with researchers preferring to network 
with European colleagues primarily for the sake of European financial support – have led to the 
European cocooning of knowledge inside the region’s physical borders, as typified in the notion 
of a ‘European research area’.  
 
At the same time, and of direct relevance to most research communities in the world, the 
international accessibility of ‘codified knowledge’ increased dramatically through the use of ICT 
along the lines of our discussion in section 2.  
 
While support for intra-European research collaboration – certainly with respect to the joint use 
of large research facilities in areas such as ‘big science’ – was very welcome, much of the most 
interesting collaboration extended well beyond European borders, and became truly global in 
                                                 
12
  This section is partly based on Soete, 2007. 
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scale. In applied research such as engineering, including energy-saving technologies and medical 
sciences and technologies, as well as the social sciences and humanities, however, knowledge 
diversion might well have been a major factor in the growth of intra-European exchange having 
taken place at the expense of extra-European exchange. In the more basic research areas where 
open international access had always existed, such ‘diversion’ had ultimately little impact.  
 
It is what could be called yet another ‘European paradox’. As Europe invested in intra-European 
research, in collaboration and the exchange of scientific knowledge among European scientists, 
or even in the technological strengthening of the competitive potential of European firms, the 
advantages of such geographically ‘bounded’ collaboration became marginal, given the 
dramatically increased opportunities for exchanging information and cooperation. It could be 
argued that the Lisbon 2000 summit represented the last major EU attempt to formulate a set of 
combined European and national policy priorities with respect to domestic knowledge creation 
and its diffusion, and social and macro-economic policies aimed at fostering European growth 
dynamics: the peak, but implicitly also the coming to an end, of 50 years of policy priority given 
to European internal integration.  
 
Our Malthusian discussion in the previous sections, suggests that most of those national (and 
European) research and technology support programmes were designed at a time when 
strengthening the international competitiveness of particular high-tech sectors and firms located 
in Europe was considered essential for Europe’s long term welfare. Today though it might be 
argued that in many areas crucial to Europe’s future welfare, such as energy saving technologies, 
research on sustainable development and climate change, health and the spreading of diseases, 
food safety, security, social sciences and humanities, etc. it is less the development within 
Europe’s national borders of technological expertise than the global access to such knowledge, 
the development of joint global standards and the rapid world-wide diffusion of such new 
technologies to other, non-EU countries which is at stake. In all these areas, the territorial 
limitation of the funding of research and innovation to domestically located public and private 
research agents appears contrary to the need for global solutions to safeguard in the long term 
European welfare.   
  
In short, the Malthusian challenges discussed above call for a much more radical and at the same 
time more straightforward level playing field approach in developing international research 
partnerships. Apart from the systematic opening up of European research programmes to 
partners outside of the EU and in particular from the South, as has now become gradually part of 
the European framework programmes, there is a need for a more active approach to international 
North-South research partnerships in those Malthusian areas of global concern described above. 
As an example of what I mean by such a more active approach, let me list some concrete 
proposals13:  
 
First, there is a growing need to explore systematically the opportunities for a full integration of 
what could be called Southern “research for development” aspects in the curricula and the 
research activities of university departments and research institutes in the North. In many 
medical faculties, food and nutrition departments, geological departments the need for such a 
                                                 
13
  For more detail see Soete, L. “International Research Partnerships on the move”, Paper presented at the 
Dutch Conference Knowledge on the Move, ISS, The Hague, January 2008.   
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more systematic integration has already become recognized sometimes under pressure of 
international, private firms’ interests, as well as more globally oriented, private philanthropic 
organisations. Much more will be needed to be done here. Higher education training and research 
is continually in search of challenging application environments. Bringing in systematically the 
Southern development environment as one of the most challenging areas for applied research 
offers new opportunities for international North-South research partnerships. Furthermore, in 
many development environments standardized data are now becoming available, opening up new 
opportunities for micro-based evidence and case study research. In short, there is a natural 
expansion of the geographical coverage of applied research beyond the Northern developed 
world.  
 
Second, one should systematically consider the possibilities for the formal twinning between 
higher education establishments and/or research institutes in the North and the South. Such a 
twinning process could offer opportunities for re-invigorating North–South research 
partnerships. Applied to the whole of Europe with its 4000 or so universities and higher 
education establishments, a coordinated twinning initiative could provide a major impetus for 
fast research capacity building in the South. The global dominance of “Northern” international 
research collaboration has been based on the concentration of private and public research funds 
in the developed countries. The remaining North-South publicly funded research partnerships 
became generally shaped within the framework of national developed countries’ so-called 
“development cooperation” activities. Often ambitious standards, reflecting specific national 
development cooperation concerns, were being set for such North-South research partnerships. 
As a result, those criteria often eliminated large parts of the developed country’s research 
community. North-South research collaboration became as a result a separate, often marginalized 
research field that focused on areas at the centre of Northern donor agencies’ concerns often 
dominated by short-term, immediate concerns.   
 
In short, a new, more radical vision of “recherche sans frontiers” should lead to a renewal of 
international North-South research partnerships in areas that are key to some of the global 
Malthusian challenges. In this research is following the process of globalization and the 
international spread of private research activities with the emergence of new research hotspots – 
no longer solely in the Northern world but increasingly also in emerging and developing 
countries.  
 
b) Innovation for local development 
 
The mirror picture of the global Malthusian challenge of international research collaboration 
consists of the local challenge of the rapid take-up and integration of new technologies within 
emerging development environments. What we will call here “innovation for local 
development”. Underlying this notion is a vision of development that acknowledges much more 
the ‘endogenous’ nature of innovation rather than the external nature of technological change. In 
the old industrial S&T model, the focus within a context of local development was quite 
naturally on technology transfer and imitation: imitation to some extent as the opposite of 
innovation. In the new model, innovation is anything but imitation. Every innovation appears 
now unique with respect to its application. Re-use and re-combinations of sometimes routine, 
sometimes novel pieces of knowledge are likely to be of particular importance, but their 
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successful application might ultimately well involve more engineering expertise and design 
capabilities than research.  
 
The need for a shift in research on innovation in private businesses has been popularized by 
Prahalad in his book “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” (2004). One of the best-known 
examples of a Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) innovation is the multiple-fuel stove innovation 
developed for the rural poor, in which cow dung and biomass (sticks and grass) can be used as 
cooking fuels. Traditionally these fuels are used in an extremely inefficient way and are 
dangerous to use due to the smoke inhaled from indoor fires. With the so-called “combination 
stove” that costs less than $20, the user can now switch relatively easily from biomass to natural 
gas, according to his/her needs. There has been a flood of similar examples of BoP innovations 
being introduced in developing countries by multinational corporations from developed 
countries, sometimes in poor rural villages, sometimes in urban slums14.  
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from such examples: first of all, the likely and most 
successful location of such innovative process activities, will have to be close to BoP users 
contexts. Given the crucial role of users in the innovation process, this will imply that BoP 
laboratories will have to be embedded in users’ environments and not be part of traditional high-
tech R&D centres and enclaves whether in the developed or developing country. In this sense the 
notion of “grassroots innovation” developed by Anil Gupta (1997) can be considered as the 
endogenous, intrinsic version of Prahalad’s external, top down version of BoP innovation. This 
brings to the forefront that for successful BoP innovation, there will be a need for a local 
business model that fully embodies local behavioural responses to innovation. Hence, the 
increasingly recognized need in BoP innovation for strategic alliances between large MNCs and 
local NGOs.  
 
Second, the innovation process itself is likely to be reversed, starting with the design phase 
which will be confronted most directly with any attempt at finding functional solutions to some 
of the particular BoP users’ framework conditions. This will involve not just the need to bring 
the product on the market at a substantially lower price than existing goods, as Prahalad 
emphasized, but also a clear adaptation to the sometimes poor local infrastructure facilities with 
respect to energy delivery systems, water access, transport infrastructure, digital access, etc. 
Autonomy is the key word here. It is no surprise that the most rapidly spreading technology in 
developing countries has been mobile communication with currently more than 3 billion users 
worldwide. Autonomy from high quality energy, water, broadband network availability is 
undoubtedly one of the most pervasive drivers for BoP innovation. Another one might well be 
“cradle to cradle” sustainable innovation. The lack of high quality logistic infrastructure facilities 
in rural development settings might well imply that once goods are sold, the repair and/or central 
recollection of obsolete goods or their parts will be expensive. By contrast local re-use along the 
principles of cradle-to-cradle might well be a new form of sustainable grassroots innovation. It is 
                                                 
14
  For some of those examples in the sanitation area, see Ramani (2008). For an overview of the BoP 
literature see Weehuizen (2008).   
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in this sense that one might talk about “appropriate innovation” and that there seems to be some 
analytical similarity with the old notion of “appropriate technology”15.  
 
Third, the feedback from BoP users and from design developers upstream towards more applied 
research assistance, even fundamental research in some of the core research labs of European 
firms might become one of the most interesting examples of reverse South-North transfer of 
technology, re-invigorating and motivating the research community in the developed world 
increasingly “in search of relevance.”16 Not surprisingly, the main focus at the moment within 
the developed world is on BoP innovations in the health area, a sector where applied medical 
research is increasingly dominated by access to new technologically sophisticated equipment and 
much less by some of the more down to earth research questions about, and the list is non-
exhaustive: anti-biotic resistance, infectious diseases or resistant tuberculosis. Not surprisingly, 
health is the sector most in need for what could be called a bottom of the pyramid research re-
prioritization. 
 
 
                                                 
15
  The notion of appropriate technology was of course much more formalized in terms of a rational set of 
economically determined “choices of technique” (Sen, 1968), depending very much on capital-labour substitution 
possibilities. The term “appropriate innovation” by contrast is much more open. 
16
  See Soete (2008) “International Research Partnerships on the Move”. 
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Figure 2: How will future national societies look like with human development within 
planet’s ecological limits?  
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